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II. Substantive Law-Public Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
The past term produced five cases of significance in the field
of constitutional law. In terms of personalities, these cases
paraded fire fighters, chiropractors and two-fisted police officers.
In terms of issues, the decisions dealt with separation of the
powers, equal protection of the laws, and due process of law in
both its substantive as well as its procedural aspects.
The case of the fire fighters, City of Alexandria v. Alexandria
Fire Fighters Association,' appears to have pioved the most controversial, as it provoked a dissenting opinion, while each of the
other cases was decided by a unanimous court. The Legislature
in 19502 provided that the work week for firemen in cities of a
population of more than 250,000 should be sixty hours; that for
those in cities of 250,000 and less, it should be seventy-two hours,
with the proviso "that in any municipality having a population
of not less than fifteen thousand (15,000) nor more than two
hundred fifty thousand .(250,000) if at an election held for that
purpose, the majority of the members of the fire department of
any city having a maximum work week of seventy-two hours,
should so vote, the maximum hours of work required of firemen
as herein provided in such city shall not be in excess of sixty
hours in any one calendar week." In the city's suit for declaratory
judgment, it asked that the statute be declared invalid as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the firemen
of the cities in the class described. Justice McCaleb, speaking for
the majority of the court, sustained this assertion. He acknowledged that there are clear exceptions to the doctrine against
legislative delegation, but found that "This is purely a legislative
function which cannot be delegated to any private group." Justice Hamiter, in his dissent, exhibited an equally strong conviction that the statute was not an unwarranted delegation of legislative authority.
In his opinion for the majority, Justice McCaleb refers to the
clearly recognized exception to the rule in the case of legislative
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 220 La. 754, 57 So. 2d 673 (1952).
2. La. Act 239 of 1950, La. R.S. 1950, 33:1994.
3. 220 La. 754, 760, 57 So. 2d 673, 675 (1952).
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delegation of power to municipalities and other political subdivisions to enact local police measures, and examples of such delegation are legion. Local option laws are a further illustration of
this type of exception. He likewise acknowledged that legislation
may be "conditioned for its operation upon the happening of a
certain contingency or future event," 4 but refused to accept the
election of the firemen in this case as an application of that exception. Quoting from the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Carter v. Carter Coal Company,5 he condemned
the statute here as "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body,
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons." 6 The firemen sought to overcome the language of the Carter case by citation of the Currin7 case, which came some three years after
Carter, and sustained a delegation of authority to the Secretary
of Agriculture to impose certain marketing quotas conditioned
upon the favorable vote of the producers of the product to be
marketed. There is some difficulty in distinguishing the subject
case from Currin, and it was on this point that Justice Hamiter
relied most strongly in his dissent.
The doctrine of delegation is but an implied corollary drawn
from the proposition of the separation of the powers which is
affirmatively expressed in Article II of our State Constitution, as
follows:
"Section 1. The powers of the government of the State
of Louisiana shall be divided into three distinct departments
-legislative, executive and judicial.
"Section 2. No one of these departments, nor any person or collection of persons holding office in one of them,
shall exercise power properly belonging to either of the
others ......
It is to be noted that the literal mandate of the Constitution
simply forbids usurpation of the powers of one department by
another, and it must be conceded that in this case there was no
attempted encroachment on the domain of the Legislature. But
the problem is not this simple, for the courts have added a gloss
to the separation of the powers principle. In the exercise of its
4.
5.
6.
7.

220 La. 754, 759, 57 So. 2d 673, 674 (1952).
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
220 La. 754, 762, 57 So. 2d 673, 675 (1952).
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
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legislative powers the legislature is not merely protected against
usurpation of that power by other departments, but under the
doctrine of delegation it is also forbidden to assign or transfer
its authority to make the laws to these other departments. The
term "legislative power" therefore requires definition, and it is
in this aspect of the case that the problem so frequently causes
difficulty, just as it did here. The identity and character of the
delegate may also present difficulty.
The author of the annotation in 79 L. Ed. 474 (1935) has certainly not overstated the complexity of the issue when he says,
at page 495:
"There is considerable confusion and uncertainty as to what
powers may be delegated by the legislature to private individuals, corporations, and associations, and how far the
operation of a statute may be made to depend upon the action
of such private persons."
And Felix Frankfurter, writing of the same problem has said,
"As a principal of statesmanship, the practical demands of government preclude [the] doctrinaire application [of the principal of
the separation of the powers] .... In a word, we are dealing with
what Madison called a 'political maxim' and not a technical rule
of law .... Enforcement of a rigid conception of separation of
powers would make modern government impossible."s
A cursory examination of the Louisiana Revised Statutes discloses ample proof of the truth of this observation. In instance
after instance the Legislature has placed important law-making
functions in the hands of private groups. A most significant illustration is to be found in the Fair Trade Law 9 giving legal validity
to private contracts negotiated between producer and seller, controlling the resale price of certain commodities and making sales
in violation thereof actionable. Similarly, the Unfair Sales Act10
confers law-making power on private groups when it makes sales
below cost unlawful and provides that the term "cost" shall mean,
inter alia, the seller's "invoice cost," a factor which is set by the
privately negotiated terms of the transaction by which the seller
acquires the goods. Another illustration is to be found in the
-. Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government 77-78 (1930).
9. La. R.S. 1950, 51:391 et seq., sustained as to constitutionality in Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942).

10. La. R.S. 1950, 51:421 et seq., sustained as to constitutionality in Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Association, Inc. v. Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1, 36
So. 2d 403 (1948).
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field of apprenticeship agreements," where legislation permits
the parties thereto through private negotiation to fix the terms
of entry into and performance of a trade. Passengers on the railroads of the state are made amenable to the privately adopted
rules and regulations prescribed by the management of the carriers.12 In the broad field of public works a majority of the persons affected may, through elections provided for in legislation,
impose their will on dissentient minorities to create drainage
districts, 3 construct street improvements 4 and sidewalks,' 5 install
street lighting facilities,' 6 establish waterworks districts, 17 sewerage districts,'8 and sewerage systems. 19
The examples cited have been chosen at random, and no
attempt has been made to compile an exhaustive list. Countless
others could doubtlessly be found. The point is that the Legislature, as a practical matter, makes numerous delegations of regulatory powers of varying magnitude to private groups. If the
power conferred on the fire fighters in the subject case "is purely
a legislative function which cannot be delegated to any private
group," we are left with the uncomfortable apprehension that a
similar fate awaits statutes of the type referred to above if and
when they are attacked on the theory of invalid delegation.
Upon more sober reflection, however, it must be conceded that
most, if not all, of these enactments would survive-or have indeed, already survived such attacks. How, then, explain the
apparent legal paradox? The answer very probably lies in a
splitting of the court's conclusion. The length of the work week
of fire fighters is unquestionably a matter of such local concern
to the municipalities that it could constitutionally be left to
appropriate local determination. For while the making of that
determination is unquestionably a "legislative function," there
is little question that the court would support such a delegation
if it were placed in the hands of the city's electors, its governing
body, its taxpayers, an administrative agency-or most anyone
other than the fire fighters themselves. It was very probably the
11. La. R.S. 1950, 23:381 et seq.
48 So. 2d 99 (1950).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

La. R.S. 1950, 45:521 et seq.
La. R.S. 1950, 33:1604, 1754.
La. R.S. 1950, 33:3682.
La. R.S. 1950, 33:3621.
La. R.S. 1950, 33:3651.
La. R.S. 1950, 33:3815.
La. R.S. 1950, 33:3952.
La. R.S. 1950, 33:3981.

See Hornsby v. LeBlanc, 217 La. 1095,
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character of the group selected as the Legislature's delegate that
troubled the court in this case. From the language of the majority
opinion it appears that the court thought that the firemen would
unquestionably vote for the shorter work week and that this
would result in an added burden to the taxpayers who could not
vote in the election. (This would be true, of course, if the city
were required to continue to pay the firemen the same amount
of money for the shorter week as they had previously received
for the longer week, as additional firemen would be required. If,
on the other hand, the city were to pay the firemen only their pro
rata compensation for sixty hours out of the wages previously
earned for a seventy-two hour work week, at least some firemen
would conceivably vote "no," and in any event, the extra wages
saved could be used to hire the additional men required, assuming no administrative obstacles, and compliance with the minimum wage provisions of R.S. 33: 1992.).
If the foregoing is a correct analysis of the majority's reasoning, it follows that it was the character of the private group to
which the legislative function was delegated, and not the nature
of the function, that invalidated the statute. In most of the other
instances in which the Legislature has delegated regulatory
powers to private groups, individuals who will be directly affected
by the regulatory action taken are, in most cases, given a voice
in the determination which is made.
To have brought the case clearly within the Currin doctrine,
it would seem necessary that the Legislature provide for the
interposition of a governmental agency who, acting upon the
vote of the fire fighters, would find that the policy of the Legislature would be promoted by the adoption of the shorter work
week.20
Equal protection and its inseparable partner, due process of
law, were unsuccessfully invoked on behalf of the chiropractors
in Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Beatty21 and
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Burton,22 and the
defendants in both cases were restrained from continuing to pursue their art without licenses to practice medicine. The Louisiana
20. For a discussion of the problem see the annotation previously cited in
the text in 79 L. Ed. 474 (1935), and Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51
Harv. L. Rev. 201 (1937).
21. 220 La. 1, 55 So. 2d 761 (1952).
22. 221 La. 372, 59 So. 2d 424 (1952).
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Legislature by enactments adopted in 191423 and 191824 broadly
defined the practice of medicine and subjected it to regulation in
the public interest. The power of a state to restrict a person from
engaging in the medical profession despite the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment has been unquestioned since 1889,
when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Dent v.
West Virginia.25 In 192426 and again in 192627 persons engaging in
chiropractic without having first obtained licenses to practice
medicine were enjoined from such unlicensed activity. During
the quarter century that followed chiropractors were neither
expressly authorized to practice their art without a license, nor
was the statute defining the practice of medicine repealed,
amended or otherwise changed. Hence it should come as no surprise that the defendants in the two cases under discussion should
similarly be enjoined in 1952. But the defendants themselves took
a different view of the matter and urged the court to do likewise.
Their defense was grounded upon the legislative definition
of osteopathy, adopted in 1932,28 which, they argued in the
abstract, indicated a general tendency to curtail the breadth of
the earlier definition of the practice of medicine. The court found
no basis for this contention, and, viewed realistically, it is difficult
to reach any other conclusion. More specifically, however, the
defendants argued that an exemption specifically created in favor
of osteopaths (as well as those for chiropodists, dentists and pharmacists) constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws to the
chiropractors who are not similarly favored by the Legislature.
But, as the court observed, equal protection is not an inflexible
barrier to classification; and viewing the exceptions which the
Legislature has been creating in favor of other groups as exemptions from the "practice of medicine" concept, these exemptionclassifications are not invalid unless arbitrary or unreasonable. As
a matter of fact, validity is presumed in such cases, as the court
itself indicated, saying, "valid ground for such an exemption in a
statute will always be presumed, it being settled that a statutory
discrimination will not be set aside as a denial of equal protec23. La. Act 56 of 1914, La. R.S. 1950, 37:1261.
24. La. Act 54 of 1918, La. R.S. 1950, 37:1261.
25. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
26. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Cronk, 157 La. 321, 102
So. 415 (1924).
27. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111
So. 58, 54 A.L.R. 594 (1926), affirmed in 274 U.S. 720 (1927).
28. La. Act 91 of 1932; La. R.S. 1950, 37:1111.
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tion of the laws 'if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it.' "29
Once the equal protection defense was overcome, no substance remained for the due process argument, for it was generally conceded that the state does have a legitimate interest in
excluding unqualified persons from engaging in the practice of
medicine.
State v. Green30 was a unanimous decision reversing a murder
conviction because of insufficient proof that oral and written confessions admitted in evidence at the trial were voluntarily made.
The case is significant, not because it establishes any new development in jurisprudence, but because of its sad commentary upon
police method. It has been an established principle of federal
constitutional law since 193631 that convictions based principally
upon confessions shown to have been extorted by officers of a
state by brutality and violence are inconsistent with the due
process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Our own
state Constitution declares that "No person under arrest shall be
submitted to any treatment designed by effect on body or mind
to compel confession of crime; nor shall any confession be used
against any person accused of crime unless freely and voluntarily made. '3 2 Yet, despite the existence of these fundamental
precepts, and the unbroken line of jurisprudence sustaining them,
of which all law enforcement officials are presumably aware, we
find the following account in the subject case:
"Defendant, an illiterate Negro, was arrested . . . and
incarcerated in jail. At about 8:00 o'clock that evening Sheriff Love, accompanied by his Chief Deputy, Jimmy Harp,
Deputies Albert Fairbanks and Fillmore Burley, the Jailer,
and four other citizens, Burley House, Pete Davis, Eddie Davis
and Ed Fairbanks, repaired to the defendant's cell for the
purpose of obtaining a confession from him. He was ques29. 220 La. 1, 9, 55 So. 2d 761, 763 (1952). The writer cannot suppress the
urge to remark that had the court indulged this customary presumption
when the legislative decision was to compel mandatory mark-up of price in
package liquor while allowing sale by the drink to go unregulated in this
respect, a different result would have been reached in Schwegmann Brothers
v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 216 La. 148, 43 So. 2d 248
(1949), criticized in this symposium two years ago, 11 LOUISIANA LAW Rr ViEw
197 (1950).
30. 60 So. 2d 208 (La. 1952).
31. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
32. Art. I, § 11. See also Art. 451, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, La. R.S.
1950, 15:451.
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tioned by these men, who worked in relays, until 4: 00 o'clock
on (the following) morning, or for approximately 8 hours.
During the vigil, defendant was admittedly struck in the
face by Chief Deputy Jimmy Harp. Sheriff Love says that
Harp slapped him but Jailer Burley (placed on the stand
by the defendant) declared that Harp struck him with his
fist or arm, smashing a cigarette in his mouth and knocking
him against the wall and that he (Burley) then left the room
because 'I didn't approve of that kind of stuff.' It is also
conceded that, on that occasion, the defendant was told by
one of his questioners 'I would like to kill you now,' and
that he was cursed.133 (Italics supplied.)
In other words, here was a case in which law enforcement officers
bolstered their ranks with purely private citizens, administered
third degree methods in relays for a period of eight hours in the
dead of night, and admittedly used some violence and threats
against the defendant. The testimony of the defendant, corroborated by that of the jailer, presents an even stronger case of force
and intimidation. And yet, these same law enforcement officers
sought a conviction based upon oral confessions given on the next
two succeeding days and a written one given on the third. The
theory advanced by the officers, as well as by the state on their
behalf, was simply "that, because defendant did not confess until
the rough
a day or two after the long periods of questioning,
84
treatment administered was of no consequence.
While it is true, as the court itself concedes, if the confessions
are in no way related to the third degree methods employed, they
may be admitted in evidence, it is nevertheless incumbent upon
the state to make an affirmative showing of those facts. Certainly
in the context in which they were offered here, and without further explanation, no sensible person could assert that the confessions were free and voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.
An observer may be wholly sympathetic with the problems
confronting law enforcement agencies, and yet be wholly justified
in asserting that this case is a shameful commentary on criminal
justice.
Another case decided during the term which bears upon the
problem of police method is State v. Mastricovo.35 In that case the
33. 60 So. 2d 208, 214 (La. 1952).
34. 60 So. 2d 208, 215 (La. 1952).
35. 221. La. 312, 59 So. 2d 403 (1952).
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defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs.
In the course of the trial there were offered in evidence narcotics
and weighing equipment which had been seized in the course of
a search without a warrant. The defendant contended, unsuccessfully, that the search having been illegal, the evidence should
have been suppressed. A uniform line of jurisprudence dating
back to 1920 holds that such evidence, although illegally obtained,
may nevertheless be admitted in evidence. The federal rule has
always been to the contrary.36 And the result remains unchanged
despite the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Wolf v. Colorado,37 holding that the Fourth Amendment
is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In a characteristically eloquent dissenting opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Murphy underscored the
necessity, as he saw it, for extending the federal rule to state
police officials who all too frequently show a callous disregard
for the right of privacy intended to be secured by the Fourth
Amendment.38
The Mastricovo case was the first to be decided since the
decision in Wolf v. Colorado, and it was at least to be hoped that
the court might reappraise the Louisiana rule in the light of what
was said there. However, the case was not cited, and the principle
involved in the Wolf case is dismissed with the mere citation of
prior Louisiana jurisprudence.
LABOR LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
The past term, like the one which preceded it, produced one
case in the field of labor law. Jones v. Hansen' was a suit by
three union members against seven of their brothers who had
served as a trial committee to hear and decide charges against
the plaintiffs, resulting in expulsion of one and suspension of the
other two from the union. Plaintiffs asked for wages lost and
for damages attributable to the defendants' advising employers
that plaintiffs were no longer members of the union in good stand36. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional
Right?, 25 Ind. L.J. 259 (1950).
37. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
38. See Reynard, supra note 36, at 306.
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 220 La. 673, 57 So. 2d 224 (1952).

